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Peopling Policy Processes? Methodological Populism in the 
Bangladesh Health and Education Sectors 
 
DAVID LEWIS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A persistent theme in the history of international development – and within the 
analysis of policy making and implementation processes more widely – is the problem 
of the insulation of so called “policy makers”1 from the realities faced by the people 
whose problems their policies are supposed to address. Indeed Robert Chambers 
(2009, p.1) has suggested that “(e)nabling people who live in poverty to analyze their 
realities, articulate their priorities, and have effective voice to influence policies, is 
one of the most pressing and most neglected issues of our time”. Yet the past decade 
has seen development agencies become less interested in the human and social aspects 
of development and more concerned with approaching development as a technical and 
managerial process (Gulrajani 2011; Wallace & Porter 2013).  
 
More emphasis is instead given to the management and delivery of aid and to the 
measurement of the “impact” of interventions than to understanding the social, 
political and human dimensions of the lives of people who live in poverty (Eyben 
2013). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries are once again 
prioritizing growth over poverty reduction, and there is a general trend towards 
favoring a stronger role in development for the private sector (Mawdsley 2017; 
Nagaraj, 2015). One consequence of this shift is that a higher proportion of 
international aid is now processed through private sector management consultants and 
accountancy firms whose core expertise is more focused on delivery, information 
systems and cost-benefit analysis than on social or human development.
 
For example, 
the UK Department for International Development’s (DFID) spending through private 
sector contractors increased from 12% in 2010/11 to 22% in 2015/16 (House of 
Commons, 2017).
2
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Policy makers usually live urban lives close to their offices and homes in capital 
cities, far away from the people living in the villages and towns affected by their 
decisions. Visits to the field are infrequent, formal and brief if they happen at all. The 
problem that Chambers (1981) described four decades ago as “rural development 
tourism” has persisted, fed further by the managerial turn in development 
administration and increasingly also by growing concerns about security (Stoddard et 
al 2011). Ann Coles (2007, p.140) in her “Portrait of an Aid Donor” describes the 
declining frequency of field visits within the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) from the 1990s onwards “which older staff remember with 
nostalgia” in favor of donor coordination meetings and regular trips to the Ministry of 
Finance in the capital cities of developing countries. More recently in an article in The 
Foreign Service Journal, Tom Dichter comments that during a study that took him to 
fourteen different USAID country offices around the world “it became clear how 
insulated agency staff have become from the countries in which they work” (Dichter 
2016).  
 
The problem of remoteness is not purely geographical, but also political. While the 
diversity of actors involved in policy-making has broadened beyond the state to also 
include civil society groups, development donors, intergovernmental agencies and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the policy process itself remains dominated 
by elites. This “pluralist elitism” (Gaventa 2004, p.297) is a second factor that means 
that policy decisions continue to be made in institutional spaces that are located far 
away from the everyday worlds of people who find themselves on the “receiving end” 
of policy. Furthermore, a gradual policy shift away from donor-funded projects on the 
ground in favor of forms of “upstream” programmatic planning and implementation 
technologies such as “sector wide approaches” (SWAPs) - particularly since the 2005 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness - has meant that the problem of remoteness has become more 
acute. 
 
A third set of issues relates to the nature of the information obtained and used by 
policy makers. The type of impersonal data produced by the information systems on 
which policy makers mostly rely further distances them from ordinary lives. 
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Monitoring and evaluation has become heavily focused on quantitative measures (in 
the effort to determine impact and ascertain measurable outcomes) and financial data 
(to assess “value for money”) rather than on forms of information that capture 
everyday experience or human perception. Quantitative approaches can be effective at 
capturing the material dimensions of developmental change but tend to be less 
adequate when it comes to engaging with issues of rights, power and voice (Fukuda-
Parr, 2013). Furthermore, Copestake and Remnant (2014) have drawn attention to 
“the limitations of a positivist approach to improving development in the face of 
overwhelming contextual complexity and multiple stakeholder interests that spawn 
diverse and competing interpretations of what constitutes credible and useful 
evidence” (p.19). While systematic technical approaches for establishing the 
effectiveness and the cost of interventions are clearly important, there is a risk that we 
end up with a narrow base of knowledge where the forms of information that are 
available to policy makers to draw upon as “evidence” fail to adequately capture the 
diversity of voices at community level.  
 
These methodological preferences are not just technical. They reflect a dominant 
ideology that privileges certain forms of knowledge over others, in ways that are as 
much about institutional control as about open-ended enquiry. According to Jennifer 
Greene (2009) this has increasingly taken the form of positivist monoculture that 
primarily serves the interests of elites with profoundly anti-democratic implications. 
Greene’s (2009, p.15) response to the problem is a call to build “an alternative view 
on credible evidence that meaningfully honors complexity, and more modestly views 
evidence as ‘inkling’ in contrast to ‘proof’”. This she suggests might enable us to do 
more justice to the messy complexity of ordinary people’s experiences, respect 
diversity and difference, and provide scope for improving “democratic inclusion” and 
listening to “multiple voices”.3 As Adams and Biehl (2016, p.124) have argued, 
evidence making is “an ethical and political proposition that knowledge can come in 
many forms and be distinctively mobilized”. Both the generation and the use of 
evidence is “entangled with politics” (Jerven 2011, p.130). 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to debates around the use of evidence by reflecting 
critically on a five-year experiment known as the “Bangladesh health and education 
reality check”. Established by the Swedish Embassy in Dhaka and by Sida 
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headquarters in Stockholm, the project gathered a form of participatory, ethnographic 
policy knowledge that was constructed from informal conversations and observations 
with service users at community level. The aim was to supplement with new people-
centered data the formal monitoring systems that had been established within two 
large sector-wide reform programs designed to strengthen the country’s health and 
education sectors. The purpose was to provide the Embassy with “the perspectives 
and experience of people living in poverty on primary education and health access” so 
that this information could be used to support the Embassy “in its policy dialogues 
with government and its development partners” (Pain et al. 2013, p.8). Using this 
distinctive and unconventional form of policy knowledge, the initiative hoped to 
bridge the gap between the multiple policy makers engaged in the implementation of 
these sector reforms, and the local people who were being affected by them. 
 
The reality check’s approach used to collect this information was, at least in theory, 
relatively simple. Over a five-year period specially trained field teams made short 
annual residential visits to a selection of households around the country and lived with 
them for five days, listening, observing and learning about their lives and experiences 
in relation to changes in local health and education services. The information gathered 
by the teams was documented as simply as possible and then written up into an 
Annual Report. These reports were discussed each year with a Reference Group made 
up of relevant policy makers in health education (drawn from government, donors and 
civil society) and then presented each year to the members of the donor consortium. 
The aim was to inform and influence those responsible for managing the programs 
using this supplementary form of data in ways that would either enable small changes 
and course corrections to be made within implementation processes, or prompt further 
investigation using the programs’ formal monitoring systems, and/or through 
commissioning in-depth research.  
The project was therefore based on a form of “methodological populism”4 that drew 
on participatory and ethnographic traditions (Mosse & Lewis 2006). It aimed to show 
the potential for “humanizing” policy processes in its effort to supplement formal 
measurement and numbers with people’s experiences and stories.  
 
2. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
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The analysis presented in this paper draws primarily on knowledge gained as an 
adviser to the project for its duration. This position offered the opportunity for a 
participant observation role that provided detailed insights into the design, planning 
and implementation of the project through direct involvement in a wide range of 
central activities: designing the overall approach, training the field teams, undertaking 
annual post-field debriefings, commenting on and writing sections for the Annual 
Reports and other project documents, and participating in subsequent attempts to use 
the outputs to influence government, donors and civil society involved with health and 
education in Bangladesh. In addition to the documents, reports and emails generated 
in the course of the work, I took notes at key meetings and events, such as closed 
workshop presentations by visiting consultants and or public report launch events 
attended by government ministers. 
 
In this way, my role was that of a “reflexive practitioner” in the sense described by 
David Mosse (in Mosse & Kruckenberg, 2017, p.211). This role implied working 
from within institutional processes and social relationships in order to gain insights as 
an insider that could then later be analyzed from the perspective of an outsider. The 
advisory role also involved participation in a wide range of meetings both within the 
project and with other stakeholders. Following Sandler and Thedvall’s (2017, p.2) 
work on “meeting ethnography”, such gatherings can be viewed as useful research 
sites where “identities, knowledge and power relationships are produced, performed, 
communicated and legitimized”. 
 
The analysis in the paper also draws on data collected from twenty-five semi-
structured interviews. These interviews were conducted by the author with a range of 
policy makers as part of a special reflection exercise held during the project’s final 
year.
5
 The reflection exercise was designed to draw critical lessons from those who 
had been involved with and supportive of the reality check, as well as a set of 
observations from those policy makers who weren’t. Donor personnel, government 
staff, and civil society activists were interviewed as well as those members of the 
Swedish Embassy in Dhaka and Sida Stockholm who were - or had once - worked 
with the project. Also interviewed were policy makers from the health and education 
sectors in Bangladesh who were not specifically known to the reality check team but 
who might have been expected to have become aware of the project during the five 
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years of its operation, and were included in order to gauge the project’s reach and 
influence. In addition to the interviews, three focus groups were also conducted as 
part of the reflection exercise with host households in one of the study locations. 
 
The paper’s analysis is also informed by findings from an independent evaluation 
commissioned at the end of the project. As the evaluation concluded, the project’s 
outcomes were mixed and contested, but the primary aim of the paper is not to 
evaluate the project’s “success” or otherwise.6 The intention instead is to reflect on its 
role as a “counter-cultural” initiative that aimed to improve policy responsiveness in 
the face of pressures to reshape development as a more technical and managerial 
process. While a focus on policy “instrumentalities” is obviously important in any 
effort to bring about positive change, the project was also motivated by the belief that 
policy makers can ill-afford to lose touch with ordinary people’s experiences, ideas, 
and voices. By bringing a human face to the numbers, indicators and technologies that 
currently dominate development policy and practice – by making an effort to move 
people’s voices and experiences to a more central position in the policy process - it 
can be seen as attempting to raise the visibility of the “subjectivities” of those who are 
impacted upon by policy (Neilsen 2011).
7
 This idea of “peopling” policy through 
initiatives such as the reality check therefore has both practical and political value.
8
 
The analysis presented here aims to contribute not only to debates around the 
distancing effects of narrowed policy knowledge (cf Adams 2016) but also to the need 
for more “engaged” forms of ethnographic enquiry (Lewis 2014).  
 
An analysis of the reality check case is potentially productive because it also allows 
further exploration of the disjuncture
9
 between linear representations of policy and 
“real world” action on the ground (Lindblom 1959; Lipsky 1980), raises questions 
about what kinds of knowledge policy makers consider to be “useful” (Cairney 2016; 
Parkhurst 2017), and highlights temporal instabilities in the policy worlds of 
international development that play an important role in further contributing to this 
disjuncture (Sogge 1996; Lewis 2015). Although the reality check design was 
primarily aimed at uncovering the experiences of ordinary people at the grassroots, it 
soon became apparent that it was also providing useful insights into the subjectivities 
of upstream policy makers. In this sense, the account presented here offers elements 
of “an ethnography of an ethnography” that analyses policy worlds in terms of power, 
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knowledge and evidence (Long & Long 1992; McGee 2004). As might have been 
expected, the reality check revealed gaps between what program documents and 
policy makers claimed was happening on the ground and what could be observed 
directly at community level. Perhaps more surprisingly, it also suggested 
discrepancies between representations of the SWAP structures and processes and the 
arrangements that actually existed. It proved difficult to feed back the reality check 
data into the existing monitoring and evaluation systems (as originally assumed) since 
these were hard to find, let alone connect with. 
 
In summary, this paper therefore draws on three inter-related levels of data in 
reflecting on the reality check project as a case: the data collected as part of the 
project itself (including the reflection exercise), a post-hoc independent evaluation of 
the project (Pain et al. 2013), and material collected during my own role as an 
observer participant. Following a short conceptual discussion of contextual issues 
around managerialism, participation, and populism in the section below, the fourth 
part of the paper briefly outlines the trajectory of the reality check project and issues 
arising from its methodology. A fifth section follows containing an analysis of three 
critical themes that emerge from the analysis: (i) contestations over the status of 
“popular knowledge”, (ii) the need for critical “policy spaces” within policy processes 
in which policy makers can engage with such knowledge, and (iii) the “disruptive 
temporalities” within policy processes that inhibit learning. 
 
3. CONTEXTUALISING THE REALITY CHECK  
 
This section seeks to understand the reality check project against four key aspects of 
the changing landscape of development policy: the implications of managerialism for 
discussions around evidence and policy; continuities between the project and other 
participatory initiatives; relationships between participation and populism; and finally, 
debates around understanding the policy process. 
 
(a) Managerialism and evidence 
 
Within the “arts of government” that are integral to current forms of neoliberalism 
(see Ferguson 2010) international aid can be understood as having become once again 
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more concerned with managing things than understanding people. Wallace and Porter 
(2013, p.4) describe a preoccupation with linear representations and measurement of 
results: “a culture of managerialism where change must first be envisaged, then 
detailed, described and planned for. Once implemented, projects must demonstrate the 
achievement of pre-set results, which must be measured and reported on in 
quantitative terms. Change is understood as linear, logical and controlled, following 
theories of change based on a cause-and-effect model”.  
 
The main claim made for the managerialist approach is that it gets things done. Martin 
Minogue (1997) suggests that “it offers both a method and a philosophy for achieving 
efficient and effective administration” (p.17). This is a seductive claim and there is 
much to be said for focusing primarily on policy impacts. Yet managerialism is also 
an ideology that derives its power from a particular way of representing the world, in 
which rational management is posited as a preferred alternative to the supposed 
irrationality of power and politics. This claim to authority is partly achieved through 
“avoiding real analysis by constructing a false reality” (Minogue, 1997, p.22), such as 
through the creation of systems of representation that appear respond to an issue 
without actually doing so, or by coining new language that reframes and evades, 
rather than addresses, a particular problem. 
 
Despite the 1990s growth of interest in “people centered” approaches to development 
among many development agencies, there has been a return to focusing on deploying 
resources effectively and securing measurable results (Eyben, 2014). Development, as 
John Clammer (2015, p.6) has argued, has come to be seen primarily as a “technical 
process” that pays insufficient attention to the “actual content of our everyday 
lifeworlds”. A pragmatic emphasis on “what works” has had implications for the 
types of evidence that can be considered useful. The status of qualitative data has 
declined in favor of approaches that emphasize measurement and quantification. In 
this new paradigm the most authoritative forms of evidence are often seen as those 
generated through the use of formal experiments such as randomized control trials 
(RCTs). For example, Vincanne Adams (2016) has critiqued the numerical metrics 
that have come to dominate global health policy and argued for more people-centred 
ways of knowing (2016). The overall result is a narrowing of the evidence base that 
feeds into policy processes. This reduces the visibility of people as the end users of 
 9 
development services and undermines the capacity of policymakers to interrogate 
different types of evidence and interpret meaning. This trend also diminishes space for 
critical thinking. As Chris Moyles (2013: 50) has suggested: “a focus on the technical 
significantly inhibits the ability of staff to engage critically with what is asked of 
them, and significantly reduces the scope of discussions of development 
interventions”. In Greene’s (2009) terms, the overwhelming need to obtain “proof” is 
increasingly prioritized over the potential value of engaging with “inkling”. 
 
(b) Participation, ethnography and policy 
 
The reality check can be situated within other traditions of participatory approaches to 
learning and action, many of which have roots in the anthropological method of 
ethnography in their goal of building more “people-centered” approaches to policy 
and practice (Chambers 1981; 1994).  
 
There have been many efforts within the participatory tradition to better link people’s 
local experiences with policy processes. For example during the late 1990s, World 
Bank Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) tried to co-construct participatory 
knowledge with poor people to inform project and policy design. The World Bank’s 
Voices of the Poor (Narayan 1999) and Sida’s Views of the Poor (Jupp et al 2007) 
were both attempts to move more “people-centered” research knowledge into 
“upstream” development policy settings and agencies.10 The Portfolios of the Poor 
approach encouraged people to keep financial diaries that gave more insight into their 
livelihoods (Collins et al., 2009).  
 
There is also a connection with the “listening study” tradition. Working within the 
media and communication field, for example, Quarry and Ramirez (2010) aim to 
challenge the bureaucratic need for control with alternative approaches to 
communication focused on “active listening, horizontal communication and mutual 
learning” (p.54). Mary Anderson et al.’s (2012) book Time To Listen reported on how 
people think about international development assistance, drawing on a thousand 
informants across a multi-country study.
11
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Finally, ideas about the potentially transformative power of professional 
“immersions” as a form of experiential learning also informed the reality check 
design. This is the idea that it is beneficial for public officials and aid workers to visit 
communities and stay for a few nights with a host family “helping with tasks and 
sharing in their life” (Chambers 2007, p.9). Advocates have suggested that the 
practice is important for development agencies because it promotes “personal 
experiential learning, face-to-face, with those we seek to serve as a key missing link 
in development practice” (Chambers 2007, p.14). Yet while building a small and loyal 
community of practice in development, such ideas have had only limited impacts on 
mainstream agency thinking and practice. 
 
The reality check’s approach can also be understood as a form of adapted or “light 
touch” ethnography. This connects it with anthropology, a discipline that has had a 
long and sometimes complicated relationship with development (Gardner & Lewis 
2015). Studies by anthropologists of development have usually been focused on 
gaining insights into the marginalized communities who tend to be “acted upon” by 
development policies and processes. They have used participant observation as a way 
of understanding ground level realities through person-to-person engagement. 
Anthropological work has frequently been critical of the idea of development itself, as 
in the case of Escobar’s (1995) poststructuralist analysis, and sometimes also of those 
“applied” anthropologists who become directly involved in policy and practice  (see 
Olivier de Sardan 2005; Crewe & Axelby 2012).
12
 
 
Anthropologists have also begun to “study up” (in Laura’s Nader’s 1969 phrase) in 
order to understand those in positions of power and authority, undertaking multi-sited 
research away from the local community locations traditionally favored by 
anthropologists (Mosse 2009). This trend has included the study of policy processes, 
where the world of international development and its agencies, sometimes known as 
“aidland”, has been a productive field.13 The anthropology of policy tends to present 
an ethnographic critique that inter alia questions the linear assumptions about the way 
policy processes work.
14
 Ethnographic approaches open up possibilities to “populate” 
the worlds of policy as social rather than merely technical processes, analyze policy 
makers’ knowledge and belief systems, understand processes of meaning making, and 
highlight the importance of informal relationships within policymaking processes. 
 11 
 
(c) Populism and development practice 
 
Elements of methodological populism can be found within participatory development 
approaches that challenge the authority of development professionals and government 
experts, and in ethnographic methods that emphasize the anthropological stance of 
seeking a “local” point of view (Mosse & Lewis 2006). Methodological populism can 
be understood as counter-cultural in the sense that it offers a disruptive challenge to 
the increasingly technocratic mainstream of development policy, since it emphasizes 
the centrality of peoples’ experiences and subjectivities. By going against the grain in 
this way, the potential value of methodological populism is the promise of bringing in 
a stronger understanding of local perspectives and perceptions and humanizing policy 
interactions. By attempting to generate policy knowledge with claims that it reflected 
the subjectivities of those affected by policy, the reality check can be understood as 
offering just such a populist counter-narrative through its appeal to the concerns of 
ordinary people. 
 
Methodological populism can be distinguished from less benign forms of ideological 
populism currently resurgent in the political sphere in both the Global South and 
North. Populism is a contested and varied concept, with emancipatory as well as 
repressive dimensions (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). While distinct from 
populism in the broader political sense, methodological populism may share some of 
the former’s less positive characteristics. One of these is the focus on a positive and 
often heavily romanticized idea of the “people”. Critics of the participation paradigm 
have been suspicious of this view, arguing that naïve visions of community underplay 
important power and difference around gender, class and ethnicity (Guijt & Shah, 
1998). Populism also embodies forms of dualist “either/or” thinking that can be 
problematic in the context of development. Binary categories reflecting ideas such as 
“indigenous knowledge vs. expert technical knowledge”, or evaluative binaries such 
as “social movements good/NGOs bad”, are over-simplifications that rarely stand up 
to detailed scrutiny (Lewis & Schuller 2017). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
another universal characteristic of populism is the implicit or explicit reference to an 
“anti-group”, usually the political elite, or expert authorities, against which a positive 
idea of the “people” is contrasted (Deiwicks, 2009). Some forms of participatory 
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development thinking risk reproducing a similar opposition between rural people and 
government officials or outsider development “experts”.  
 
(d) Policy interfaces 
 
A key aim of the reality check was to influence policy. Its design made certain 
assumptions about how policy works, and about the role of evidence within 
policymaking. These assumptions need further interrogation, since they would turn 
out to be inaccurate in some respects.  
 
Policy remains a taken for granted category of social action that receives surprisingly 
little fine-grained attention, despite the existence of differing models of what is often 
termed “policy process”. The tendency is simply to see policy as a “black box” in the 
form of “an unproblematic given, without reference to the sociocultural contexts in 
which it is embedded and understood” (Wedel et al. 2005: 43)’. Mainstream theory on 
policy from within older public administration traditions tends to have a rational 
linear orientation that today feels dated. On the one hand, this literature sets out 
rational choice models of policy as linear stages, (i.e. first problem identification, then 
policy formulation, and then finally implementation), or as systemic “streams” 
(Kingdon 1984). Implementation is conceptualized as a technical political problem 
that can be “solved” with the right combination of factors. On the other, this “mind 
the gap” approach to policy does not stand up to proper scrutiny (Mosse 2005). It is 
challenged by Lindblom’s (1959) “science of muddling through”, and Clay and 
Schaffer’s (1984, p.192) view of policy as “a chaos of purposes and accidents”. It 
pays insufficient attention to representation, power and contingency, and to the social 
processes that construct policy meanings and action among different actors (Mosse 
2004).  
 
An actor-oriented sociological approach (Long 2000) offers a more dynamic and less 
rigid way of conceptualizing policy processes. Drawing on this approach, Brock, 
McGee and Gaventa’s (2004) “knowledge, actors and spaces” framework provides a 
useful way forward. It recognizes that the linear models are detached from, and at 
odds with, the realities of power and contingency that actually influence policy 
decisions. Yet it also recognizes the way that linear models retain their attraction 
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because they are nevertheless useful to policy actors, offering useful mental maps that 
policymakers can use. McGee (2004) notes the contradiction that these linear policy 
models persist despite their obvious limitations, simply because they fit with the 
subjectivities of policy makers and enable them to act.  
 
While the linear model survives as a “necessary fiction”, more accurate, realistic and 
dynamic models are needed with better insight into how policy actually operates. This 
requires understanding the different levels of policy action and interactions among the 
wide range of actors involved, the nature of the policy spaces in which they interact, 
and the micro-politics of how information gets transformed into evidence. Every so 
often, development agencies recognize that aspects of the simple linear assumptions 
about policy need to be challenged and engage in reflection. For example, as part of 
the “doing development differently” initiative, concerns were raised about “short-
termism” within World Bank interventions that may negatively affect “long-term 
institution building and transformational engagement” (Bain 2016, p.113). 
 
This question of policy knowledge, and the need to provide more and better evidence 
to policy makers, has been widely debated (Weiss, 1979; Adams, 2016). Debates can 
sometimes appear to be polarized unhelpfully between two positions: the evidence-
based policy making (EBPM) perspective that “there can and should be a direct and 
unproblematic link between scientific evidence, policy decisions, and outcomes” 
which is increasingly viewed by critics as naïve, and the realist but somewhat extreme 
policy-based evidence view that “politics is so pathological that no decision is based 
on an appeal to scientific evidence if it gets in the way of politicians seeking election, 
or so messy that the evidence gets lost somewhere in the political process” (Cairney 
2016, p.2). The reality check provides insight into how action actually emerges (or 
does not emerge) from contestations among policy makers around the competing 
knowledge claims of those involved in the policy process. 
 
4. THE REALITY CHECK INITIATIVE 
 
We turn now to look in more detail at how the reality check initiative played out in 
practice. In the first part of this section, the progress and reception of the project are 
briefly summarized, building on the short overview provided earlier. In the second, 
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issues arising from the reality check’s methodology relevant for our discussion are 
discussed.  
 
(a) The project 
 
The aim of the reality check experiment was twofold: to document poor people’s 
everyday perceptions and experiences with the implementation of ongoing policy 
reforms in “real time”, and then to use the knowledge created as supplementary 
evidence that could better inform policy makers by providing a clearer understanding 
of front line implementation issues from the “bottom up”. The key guiding questions 
were “whether user needs correspond with the policies underlying the two programs 
and to what extent, knowledge and local interpretations of interventions correspond 
with their intended purposes” (Arvidson 2013, p.281).15 
 
As we have seen, the project was conceived as part of the Swedish government’s 
support to Bangladesh’s two multi-donor sector wide health and education reforms. 
As a relatively small donor, Sweden wanted to add value and “punch above its 
weight” within two program consortia that were dominated by the larger mainstream 
agencies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and DFID. The way it 
hoped to do this was by developing and implementing a distinctive experimental add-
on component that could sit alongside the two existing programs and supplement the 
existing management information systems and monitoring activities by feeding in 
additional information from the grassroots. The SWAP program designs were mainly 
focused on generating extensive “upstream” quantitative information around technical 
assistance, resource monitoring and donor coordination, but had given less attention to 
gathering and using “downstream” information relating to implementation processes 
and users. The reality check was “devised to function as a complementary source of 
information that goes beyond statistics and frameworks for monitoring outputs” 
(Arvidson 2013, p.281). This idea of raising the profile of service users on the ground 
also fitted with Sida’s stated commitment to rights, accountabilities, participation and 
transparency in its development work, an approach it was particularly keen to 
highlight.  
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The method used a form of “light touch” ethnography based on participant 
observation that could provide a closer link to people’s experiences on the ground. 
The project first identified and trained small teams of researchers to live for short 
periods of participant observation with twenty-seven poor “host households” located 
in three different regional locations around the country.
16
 These locations were 
selected to reflect the country’s diversity with coverage of communities in the north, 
south and central areas of Bangladesh. Secondary data relating to poverty line, under-
five child mortality, and relative food insecurity figures was consulted in order to 
make these choices. Within each of these three main regional locations there was a 
further effort to reflect different kinds of local setting by identifying three more 
categories of local context in the form of an urban, rural and peri-urban study site. In 
each of these nine locations individual host households were then carefully identified 
in each area. This was facilitated through community level discussions with local 
NGOs and local key informants such as schoolteachers and community leaders. As 
the first Annual Report stated, the intention was to select areas and identify 
households that could be described as “objectively poor”. Both the locations and the 
household identities were concealed in the reporting documents in order to safeguard 
people’s privacy and protect them from official repercussions. In line with the 
project’s overall aim of “taking the pulse” by providing indicative information rather 
than systematically sampled or structured research data, the relatively small number 
of households and locations was judged to be an effective compromise by the reality 
check team and the Embassy. 
 
While in the field the teams were encouraged to refrain from actively questioning 
people or soliciting information directly. They were not asked directly about specific 
policies. Instead, the aim was to listen to people’s stories about their general 
experiences with health and education, to accompany them as they went about their 
daily lives (including when they were using or attempting to use local services), and 
to document what they saw and heard. They also encouraged their host household 
members to document experiences themselves, using drawings, and disposable 
cameras, for example, and the teams also made sure to engage in conversation with 
neighbors and visitors. The teams aimed to establish rapport, participate in the lives of 
these households (if only for a relatively brief time), and learn from them by taking 
the insider’s point of view as far as possible. They returned each year to the same 
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families in order to build the relationship and learn about how things were or weren’t 
changing.
17
 
 
The objective was not to offer “findings”, draw conclusions or make 
recommendations to policy makers in the traditional way. Instead the intention was to 
provide fine grain description giving as much emphasis as possible to conveying 
people’s own voices and representations. The Annual Reports that were produced 
from the data mostly contained stories, cases, quotations and pictures and were 
written in a style that aimed to be as unmediated and plurivocal as possible. It was 
hoped that the reports would contribute to the widening of policy makers’ knowledge 
base, feed into ongoing planning and monitoring processes, and potentially lead to 
“course corrections”. In this way, the initiative was designed to complement rather 
than substitute for formal data collection, adding an additional new source of people-
centered knowledge to the technical management information systems that had 
already been established within the programs by the government and the international 
development agencies. If necessary, it was intended that issues arising from the reality 
check data could also be followed up within the SWAPs using more standard forms of 
research or monitoring.
18
  
 
What happened? The teams were able to learn a great deal from listening to people 
and observing local conditions. Much of this related to the “big picture” – for 
example, here was a hospital that was supposed to have been built but was way 
behind schedule, and there was a supposedly free service that in practice people had to 
pay for because informal charges were often imposed by unofficial intermediaries. As 
expected, striking disjunctures were apparent between policy-level representations of 
what was happening, and peoples’ experiences on the ground. For example, one 
program document listed the successful placement of Citizen’s Charter on the walls of 
all public hospitals visible to all visitors setting out their rights as hospital users, but 
the reality check data made it clear that these were generally poorly understood and 
rarely used. People’s stories brought home just how unlikely it was that anyone would 
make a complaint about poor service or bad treatment: ‘I am not willing to make 
complaints in the hospital. If I were to do so, I would not receive any services in the 
future as they would recognize me’. It also highlighted the importance of informality 
in determining local service delivery outcomes, such as presence of gatekeeper 
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intermediaries who controlled access to supposedly free services and imposed 
discretionary charges, or the continuing presence of private pharmaceutical company 
representatives on hospital premises who were influencing medical decisions, despite 
the recent introduction of new restrictions on their activities. These were the kinds of 
issues that were observed by reality check teams as they accompanied household 
members in their efforts to access services. 
 
In education, despite the country’s achievement of near universal primary education, 
quality was found to have remained low. Children reported feeling unengaged by the 
culture of teaching in the classroom, and the team’s observations confirmed this. 
School dropouts were revealed as less likely to be the result of household economic 
pressures, as commonly believed, and more likely to be the result of this lack of 
engagement, particularly in the case of boys. It was found, surprisingly perhaps, that 
even the very poorest parents expressed a strong commitment to the value of 
education and sending their children to school. This challenged a widespread belief 
among policy makers and some other outside experts that household economic 
pressures in poor households were the primary cause of primary school dropout – and 
this was an example of a reality check finding that over time gradually gained traction 
with policy makers, unsettling this widely-held conventional wisdom.  
 
Another insight was the importance of effective local school leadership as a critical 
factor in improving the quality of education. This contrasted with observed practices 
of making school staff appointment decisions based on family, political affiliation or 
patronage rather than on evidence of skills or motivation. In the few cases where 
effective leadership was observed in a local school or health center this was seen to 
make a very significant difference in the performance of those facilities, as in the case 
of the school level implementation plans (SLIP) project.
19
 Parent teacher associations, 
where policy makers believed local participation could take place, were often found 
not to actually exist on the ground, despite being regarded by policy makers as key 
tool for facilitating local engagement and participation. 
 
Also revealing was the wealth of information generated about the less visible and 
subtler everyday realities faced by people living in poverty. For example, the culture 
of the hospital visit was vividly brought to life, along with the anxieties experienced 
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by the low-income service user. For example, the status hierarchy of the doctor-
patient relationship was experienced in ways that severely discomforted the user from 
a poor household who was on the receiving end. It became apparent from listening to 
people’s experiences about how they felt when being examined by unsympathetic 
medical professionals: ‘We would feel good if doctors examine the patient’s body 
sympathetically, but we hardly ever get to experience that’. More controversially, a 
positive view of “traditional” birth attendants (TBAs) was evident, despite the fact 
that these are increasingly denigrated within program policy discourses centered on 
improving maternal care with more “modern” providers. The TBAs were generally 
appreciated as doing a good job in meeting poor people’s basic health needs – a 
finding that jarred somewhat with the Sida-endorsed policy commitment to 
identifying and training a different group of skilled professionalized midwives to 
replace them. There was suspicion of the latter, too, since local experiences suggested 
that being motivated more by profit than by local community values led these newly-
trained professionals to sometimes provide an inferior service.
20
 
 
(b) Methodological issues and challenges 
 
The reality check approach shared characteristics with forms of participatory action 
research by insisting that this was collecting data with people and not on people 
(Hennink et al. 2011). The methodology made explicit a set of values around having 
“conversations rather than interviews”, “learning rather than finding out” and “living 
with rather than visiting” (Arvidson 2013). This was intended to reflect the fact that 
the reality check positioned itself neither as conventional research, with its overtones 
of extraction, nor simply as a set of participatory exercises with its implications of 
control. The field teams presented themselves to host households as not directly 
linked to the decision makers involved in the health and education sectors but instead 
as independent learners who would pass on people’s views and experiences to those 
engaged in policy making.   
 
In general, the project underestimated just how challenging the approach to data 
collection would be, and how difficult it would be to use the material that was 
obtained. The fieldwork was undertaken under tight time constraints and the teams 
often found themselves living in tough conditions. The priority was to visit some of 
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the poorest households and this meant that some team members would for example 
have to share small rooms with many household members, in surroundings that were 
unhygienic and sometimes open to the elements.  
 
The closeness of the contact was key and led in many cases to useful insights into 
micro-level processes. For example, the sharing of food within the household during a 
period of rapid food price increase amidst sudden economic downturn gave 
unexpected insight into dietary changes and public health, when increasingly high 
levels of salt were used by poor people to flavor the lower quality food they could 
now only afford and compensate for its inferior taste. This approach led to both fine-
grained detail in its insights, and helped to create good relationships. As Patta Scott-
Villiers (2014) observed when using the approach in another setting during a civil 
society evaluation in Uganda: 
 
As the time goes by, everyone relaxes and although it is never a completely 
normal situation, the conversation does settle down and the issues debated 
become more and more those that simply arise in the living of everyday life. 
While the stories are fragmentary and positioned, there is a sense that the 
reality check gets at what matters to people. And it gets at the complex reality 
of lived life, rather than simplified bureaucratic versions of life. 
 
This mode of working eventually began to create strong bonds that helped to build 
trust and create high quality conversations. People told us that they were appreciative 
of simply being listened to by outsiders, and this made it more likely that they would 
talk openly about their situations: ‘We have many complaints and suggestions to 
make, but nobody ever listens’.  
 
There was no evidence that over time the host households deliberately manipulated or 
mislead the teams. The independent evaluation reported that the reality check 
“produced plausible, credible and valuable understanding of the experience of people 
living in poverty and the challenges that they face in accessing health and education 
public services” (Pain et al. 2013, p.8). However, it was sometimes difficult to sustain 
the quality and detail of the conversations over time. Regular visits built up trust, but 
Arvidson reported that relationships could sometimes assume a taken-for-granted 
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quality. For example, strategies were needed to ensure that substantive discussions 
were sustained: “During our fourth and fifth year, our intimate relationship with Alia 
was mainly evident by the fact that she did not feel compelled to look after us as 
guests, but got on with her very busy life while we could sit in her home and 
exchange a few sentences with her now and then … Although her very relaxed and 
inviting manners made our stay emotionally comfortable – we felt safe, secure and 
privileged to enjoy her company – it did not really provide us with much by way of 
conversations anymore” (Arvidson 2013, p.289). In this case, the conversation was 
reinvigorated by temporarily adopting a more formal question and answer approach, 
which reset the relationship, a fact apparently welcomed by the household member.  
 
5. POLICY KNOWLEDGE, SPACE AND TIME 
 
The case provides new insights into three aspects of policy processes in terms of how 
policy makers interact with information and decide whether or not it is useful: (i) how 
the status of “popular knowledge” is contested, (ii) problems in the creation and 
utilization of “knowledge spaces”, and (iii) the role played by “disruptive 
temporalities” that inhibit learning within policy worlds. This section discusses the 
main findings drawn from the policy maker interviews and from participant 
observation during the project. 
 
(a) The status of popular knowledge 
 
How do certain kinds of knowledge come to be seen or not seen by policy makers as 
“evidence”? The reality check challenged the unhelpful binaries described earlier by 
highlighting how the construction of policy knowledge is not fixed or cumulative, but 
negotiated. Such negotiations take place on contested terrain that can be understood as 
“battlefields of knowledge”, in which different perspectives are questioned, agreed, 
challenged and reinforced (Long & Long 1992; Gaventa 2004).  
 
There was certainly an initial interest generated by the experiment, and the outputs 
produced were well received by some individuals in the policy maker community. For 
example, the World Bank country office head in Dhaka decided to issue the project’s 
Annual Reports to all its visiting consultants to remind them of the people behind the 
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policies. But overall, despite recognition of the insights gained into the lives of people 
living in poverty, results were mixed in terms of the reality check’s objective to 
inform and influence policy makers, as found by the independent evaluation (Pain et 
al., 2013, p.8).
21
 There was resistance among policy makers to the reality check’s 
presentation of popular knowledge - both in terms of the form of the outputs that were 
produced, and to many of the messages themselves. The common responses were (and 
here I am paraphrasing based on observations made during the project) either –“We 
can’t use this, it’s not in a form we recognize”, or “We can’t trust this, it’s not proper 
data, just anecdotes”, or “We already know this, we’re working on it”, or – most 
alarmingly, because there were agreements in place to ensure the anonymity of our 
informant households and conceal their locations - “Tell us who these people are, and 
we’ll go fix it”. 
 
A frequent objection rested on doubts among some policy makers about the project’s 
methodology. There were concerns voiced about the reliability of the data, and about 
sample size and generalizability.
22
 The validity of the material was questioned by staff 
more used to formal monitoring data and who tended to dismiss the teams’ reliance on 
conversations rather than structured interviews, and on what they saw as voices and 
stories rather than numbers and other objective information.
23
 Resistance to the 
project was framed in terms of a collision between stories and facts, in which reality 
check data was viewed negatively as “anecdote”. The information was also seen as 
awkward to use in the course of formal policy discussions and negotiations. Policy 
makers found it understandably difficult to engage with relatively unmediated 
qualitative data that took the form of personal insights and reflections on experience. 
There were justified criticisms that the Annual Reports were sometimes difficult to 
read and draw actionable lessons from, and the independent evaluation report also 
raised valid critical points about the way the material was sometimes presented (Pain 
et al. 2013).  
 
Another common reaction to the material was that it confirmed what was already 
known and was not therefore useful. Indeed, the data did sometimes reinforce existing 
knowledge. While this could be viewed as being useful in affirming the accuracy of 
the existing knowledge base on which policy makers were basing their assumptions 
and decisions, it was not always received as such. Some government and donor 
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officials dismissed the Annual Reports because they said that they were not learning 
anything new from them. When we did interviews for the reflection report at the end 
of the five years, one person at the Embassy told us that perhaps they could have done 
more to highlight some of the results, but that in their view ‘None of the findings have 
been interesting enough’. 
 
The Annual Reports were often criticized or ignored, and were only occasionally 
acted upon. Sometimes this was simply because program staff were disappointed that 
their own representations of the programs were being questioned. This made some 
viewpoints or stories expressed in the reports “risky” to engage with because they 
destabilized shared representations and program stories.
24
 In general, it was easier for 
the reality check team to engage a few key individuals with critical insights in 
informal “safe” situations than it was to discuss the reality check findings 
systematically within formal policy spaces or arenas, where the knowledge was likely 
to take on a more “risky” character.  
 
Reaction to the project highlighted the routine nature of policy work. During the 
reflection exercise carried out at the end of the project, some policy makers explained 
to us how far down their day-to-day priorities the reality check concerns had been. 
They were preoccupied with what they saw as other more important issues, or were 
simply too busy. Even the specially-assembled reality check Reference Group was 
difficult to engage and lacked energy, with its members’ commitment undermined by 
pressures of other work: ‘The problem with the Reference Group is that most of us are 
so busy. I think we could not really devote the time that was needed, I confess that’. 
 
Amnog the reality check team, such objections sometimes fed into a populist view of 
the people versus local elites. When this happened, a form of “othering” of policy 
makers who were unconvinced by the reality check approach was occasionally 
visible. As the project unfolded, some members of the reality check team would see 
themselves as taking a local point of view on behalf of “their” host households against 
policy elites. This fueled a counter-narrative that was occasionally prone to 
characterize or even caricature policy makers as unimaginative, and donors as too 
rigidly technocratic. This was undoubtedly a factor that contributed to suspicion 
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around the reality check’s outputs and its guiding principles among some policy 
makers.  
 
The project nevertheless helped to raise the profile of Sweden’s contribution to the 
donor consortia, and highlighted its principles of transparency, participation, rights 
and accountability. As one former Sida Embassy staff member remarked in the 
reflection interview: ‘The Reality Check made us more visible, and it gave us 
something to bring to the table’. The approach has also been subsequently replicated 
both within and outside the country, spawning a small movement around its use as a 
development planning and evaluation tool.
25
 
 
(b) The importance of policy spaces 
 
Different types of knowledge are involved in the design and implementation of 
policies: “official knowledge” that is normally based on national level survey-based 
statistical data, “policy narratives” in the form of the stories that different policy 
actors construct in order to informal policy making processes, and “popular 
knowledge” that is held by those people who directly experience poverty and who 
find themselves on the receiving end of policy interventions in their name (McGee 
2004). These interactions can be understood as taking place at the “interface” between 
different actors and forms of knowledge, and where “discontinuities of values, 
interests, knowledge and power” become visible (Long & Lui 2009, p.71). The reality 
check was essentially an attempt to alter the balance of power by raising the status of 
popular knowledge in relation to that of official knowledge.  
 
The concept of policy space implies not only physical space, such as the technical 
meetings where it was hoped that reality check data could be connected with and fed 
meaningfully into existing monitoring and evaluation systems. It also implies mental 
and cultural space in which a culture of trust can be created for the safe exchange of 
knowledge and ideas. Despite the intention of the reality check design to create 
dedicated invited policy spaces for creative discussion and exchange of the new data, 
this turned out to be one of the experiment’s weak points. Attempts to engage took 
place in both formal and informal policy spaces. The main formal arena was the 
“designed space” in which each year’s draft Annual Report was presented to a 
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Reference Group, made of representatives of the donors and the government, before 
presentation to the donor consortia. Either these spaces failed to materialize, turned 
out to be excessively formalized and apathetic (as in the case of Reference Group 
meetings), or became unhelpfully conflictive and therefore unproductive. Overall, the 
expected formal opportunities to feed reality check data into ongoing SWAP 
management information systems did not in practice materialize, raising questions 
about the efficacy and even in some cases the very existence of such systems. This 
finding, along with the example of the parent teacher associations made earlier, 
resonates with Minogue’s (1997) point regarding managerialism’s reliance on the 
construction of a “false reality”.  
 
Formal meetings also took place between members of the reality check team and the 
embassy, along with more public launch events with civil society groups. Informal 
interactions also took place outside these forums with individuals from these agencies, 
some of whom became personally interested in the reality check work. A few 
informal “change champions” who saw the potential of the approach were also 
identified. Formal spaces in particular were often highly charged zones of status and 
prestige, in which professional identities and interests were at stake. Here it became 
possible to observe the “struggle between actors who aim to enroll others in their 
‘projects’, getting them to accept particular frames of meaning, winning them over to 
their points of view” (McGee 2004). These tensions sometimes led to conflicts 
between members of the reality check team and other program and government staff, 
and these became a key factor limiting the “take up” by policy makers of reality check 
data.  
 
When data was resisted this was often by those with an interest in maintaining the 
existing hierarchy of knowledge that was embedded in the design of the program. 
This became a contestation in large part driven by habits of practice, since most policy 
makers were more used to valuing forms of knowledge that were more formal, 
measurement-oriented and results-based. Those who did wish to engage in ways that 
went beyond surface level were more likely to do so outside of formal settings, as 
individuals, and in less formal ways.
26
 In this way the reality check offered a 
challenge to managers’ distanced abstractions, the “thin, schematic models” of social 
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interaction characterized by James Scott (1998, p.310) in his book Seeing Like A 
State. 
 
These tensions around knowledge and status were important, but were not the only 
factors that got in the way. The view of the policy process afforded by the reality 
check suggested that policy makers would not necessarily have taken on board less 
contentious forms of “evidence” either. Policy makers are required to make their 
decisions in circumstances of bounded rationality based on dealing with the twin 
problems of uncertainty due to limited information, and of ambiguity since there are 
always multiple ways of understanding a policy problem and its possible solutions 
(Cairney 2016). Furthermore, policy actors may often be in competition with each 
other in both the interpretation of information, and in advancing possible solutions to 
problems. The rational response of the policymaker is therefore to take shortcuts – 
such as drawing on information only from their most trusted sources, and utilizing and 
adapting it to the ideas and beliefs they already hold, so that they “reveal their biases 
towards certain courses of evidence, which may be more important than the nature of 
the evidence itself” (Cairney 2016, p.5).  
 
Policy makers can only pay attention to a small amount of the possible evidence that 
they could use, and they use strategies such as filtering and framing in order to help 
them get around the problem. They will always make decisions by utilizing some 
types of information and ignoring others. Carol Weiss (1979, p.430) was once moved 
to complain that “[t]here has been much glib rhetoric about the vast benefits that 
social science can offer if only policy makers paid attention”. The idea that evidence 
can inform policy in any straightforward way - as is sometimes believed to be the case 
in more technical policy decision making settings such as health and drugs policy – is 
increasingly questioned (Parkhurst 2017). Many other political, social and economic 
factors come into play to influence policy decisions. 
 
The reality check’s position alongside the two sector-wide approaches provided a 
vantage point from which to observe broader aspects of the policy process. Some of 
the reality check team began to question key assumptions on which the reality check 
project had been designed, which in retrospect had assumed a relatively linear model 
of policy processes. For example, it had been assumed that new data could simply be 
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fed into existing project systems and structures in order to achieve results. This was 
found to be strongly at odds with the messy reality of the programs, where 
management information systems always seemed to be work in progress and still 
under construction, or else produced highly technical information that was difficult to 
link with in a meaningful or productive way. And as the evaluation of the reality 
check pointed out, the reality check design had not paid much attention to developing 
its own management information system that might have made this easier (Pain et al, 
2012). 
 
(c) Disruptive temporalities 
 
The world of development policy is characterized by the bounded and relatively short 
lives of projects and posts, in a phenomenon that has been termed the “continuity of 
discontinuity” (Sogge, 1996, p.16). This has a disruptive effect, driven by the rapid 
turnover of personnel within both foreign donor agencies and government offices. 
International staff – if they are not temporary consultants - are normally hired on 
short-term contracts of around two years’ duration, and in the Bangladesh domestic 
policy environment there are frequent political or administrative reshufflings of senior 
government posts.  
 
This both impacted upon, and was challenged by, the reality check experiment. 
Disruptive temporalities produced a form of instability that meant that after the first 
two years it became difficult to sustain a viable representation of the reality check 
initiative to its “upstream” audiences from one year to the next. The team was 
constantly forced to explain again the reality check principles and purpose to an ever-
changing array of policy makers throughout its duration. Having to introduce new 
occupants of key jobs in government and donors and sensitize them to the principles 
and ideas of an unfamiliar – and sometimes unwelcome – initiative sometimes had the 
effect of draining energy from the team and the project.  
 
Yet the reality check also challenged these temporal norms through its use of return 
visits to households over the comparatively long period of five years. People at the 
study sites told us that they were not accustomed to encountering repeat visits from 
outside “experts”. As one host family member stated when we discussed this issue in 
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a focus group during the end of project reflection exercise: ‘First we did not believe 
that they would come back. But by the end of the first visit, we shared a relationship 
with each other and we thought she would not be lying to us’. This emphasis on the 
long term was a key strength of the approach. Trust was built up primarily because 
unlike other outsiders, the same individuals returned the next year just as they had 
promised, thereby disrupting the traditional pattern of “one off” visits by aid 
professionals, NGOs and government personnel. However, the project was itself 
occasionally vulnerable to patterns of short termism as well, since it was not possible 
to ensure that all the field team members remained in place for the full five-year 
period. Several left and were replaced during the project.  
 
With their listening stance on the ground, the reality check teams aimed to challenge 
normal practices of development agency and government staff, for whom field visits 
tend to be tightly organized, highly orchestrated, and formally structured. But since 
the reality check was not conducted as in-depth ethnography, it was vulnerable to the 
criticism that it was not nearly immersive enough. It was essentially “quick and dirty” 
work, based on spending just a few days and nights living with households, listening 
to their stories, and documenting their experiences. By the standards of conventional 
ethnography, such criticisms were justified. Another shortcoming was that the regular 
visits did not lead to empowered action that might have enabled people to express 
their views more directly to policy makers, another point made in the evaluation (Pain 
et al. 2013).  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The problem that policy makers remain remote from the realities of the lives of the 
people they are supposed to be addressing, and may be becoming increasingly so, 
does not lend itself to simple solutions. The reality check case suggests that efforts to 
“bridge the gap” through the generation and application of people-centered 
information in the hope that it can be translated into better evidence for making policy 
decisions does offer a possible way forward. Analytically, it demonstrates the power 
of counter-cultural populist ideology to express popular grassroots subjectivities in the 
struggle to “humanize” policy processes that have become increasingly subject to 
managerialism. The case also confirms much of what we know about the non-linearity 
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and messiness of policy processes. The distance between policy and people is not 
easily bridged: as David Mosse’s (2004) work reminds us, such “gaps” can be 
understood illusory products of simplified linear understandings of policy processes 
that are at odds with more complex contingent factors that are at play.  
 
The case also highlights some significant problems around issues of power, space and 
temporalities in the analysis of how policy makers interact with evidence. It shows 
how the status of “popular knowledge” struggles to gain traction in relation to other 
forms of evidence, highlights problems in the creation and utilization of “knowledge 
spaces”, and suggests that “disruptive temporalities” within the policy process 
undermines learning. The reality check’s attempt to alter the balance of power 
between the status of popular and official knowledge met with only limited success, 
since it was unable to adequately challenge dominant metrics ideologies, in part 
because the project refused to present its data in a recognizably “useable” form. The 
challenge of creating suitable discursive knowledge spaces for policy makers to 
engage critically with unconventional data proved difficult to overcome, since the 
model of the policy process that had informed the reality check design was itself at 
odds with reality. Finally, the constant state of flux within the policy world in which 
the reality check experiment was conducted further undermined its efforts to stabilize 
a coherent representation of its identity and purpose, as it faced a constantly changing 
cast of individual policy makers. This temporal disjuncture further reduced the space 
for dialogue around the data that was generated.  
 
Although the majority of policy makers in Bangladesh paid little attention to the 
reality check’s portrayal of people’s experiences and stories, it does not of course 
follow that they would have been more influenced by conventional forms of evidence, 
at least not in a straightforward way. We should not be under the illusion that more 
inclusive forms of evidence-based policymaking will necessarily contribute to better 
policy making. The EBPM discourse, like that of methodological populism, can be 
understood ideologically as framing the domains of knowledge contestation within 
policy worlds in oversimplified ways. The linear model of the policy process may be 
useful and practical, but it is also lacks accuracy. 
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While problems around the status of popular knowledge, unclear assumptions about 
the role of evidence in policy, and disruptive temporalities should not be 
underestimated, none is insurmountable within the imperfect world of efforts to better 
link evidence and policy. Moving beyond the critical deconstructivist approaches of 
some anthropologists, a link with meta-modernist theory and its sense of “guarded 
hopefulness” could offer a potentially useful way to navigate the poles of optimism 
and naivety, or of hope and despair, that are raised by methodological populism of 
this kind. Its emphasis on oscillation is a call to move beyond ‘either/or’ towards 
‘both/and’ thinking, and expresses a productive tension that enables us to hold onto 
contradiction (Vermeulen & van den Akker 2010, p.2). The reality check’s 
subsequent replication and adaptation in several other countries and settings suggests 
that it has become a viable “mobilizing metaphor” (Wedel et al., 2011) with the 
potential to animate methodological and cultural change within policy worlds. If the 
challenges raised by the Bangladesh case can be addressed then there may be scope 
for such examples of methodological populism to contribute to the further 
humanization or “peopling” of policy processes.  
 30 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
 The term “policy maker” is commonly used by academics to describe the expected 
audience for implementation recommendations arising from research. It has a 
problematic lack of precision since it refers to a wide range of people, from elite 
politicians to street level bureaucrats (Lewis 2012a). In the context of the reality 
check it refers to high-level government personnel, international donor staff, and 
senior program planners. 
 
2
 The UK House of Commons International Development Committee recently raised 
concerns about the quality of DFID’s oversight of the supply chain and the “appalling 
conduct of some contractors” (House of Commons, 2017).  
 
3
 New approaches to evaluation have begun to pay more attention to equity issues (see 
for example Segone 2011). 
 
4
 This can be distinguished from two other modes of anthropological engagement: (i) 
critical “deconstructivist” approaches, such as Arturo Escobar’s (1995) view of 
development primarily as a discourse of power imposed by the West, and (ii), 
“instrumental” approaches in the form of conventional applied development work 
(Mosse & Lewis 2006). 
 
5
 Lewis (2012b). 
 
6
 An independent evaluation of the project was undertaken at the end (Pain et al., 
2013). 
 
7
 A related approach is found in Hakan Seckinelgin’s (2017, p.xiii) study of 
HIV/AIDS and policy processes in which he suggests that “policy thinking should 
start from the way in which the disease is experienced by real people in different 
contexts of their lives”. 
 
8
 A new anthropology of policy connects policy to wider structures of power, and 
addresses the messiness of policy worlds, based on critical rather than applied 
approaches (see for example Wedel et al., 2005; Shore, Wright & Però, 2011). 
Neilsen’s (2011) work on “subjectivities” analyses how various social actors think 
about and experience policy differently, and I have borrowed her term “peopling 
policy” for this paper. I use it here to draw attention to two related but different 
themes: the populist idea that people on the “receiving end” of policy matter; and the 
need to challenge the techno-managerial logic of policy within a humanistic 
perspective. 
 
9
 See Lewis and Mosse (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the issue of 
“disjuncture” in development. 
 
10
 Responses to these initiatives varied. An Oxfam review praised Time to Listen’s 
finding that communities wanted aid workers to be more rooted and ‘present’ in local 
communities, and for its focus on examining longer term aid impacts beyond 
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transitory projects (Green, 2013). Cornwall and Fujita (2012, p.1761) wrote less 
positively of the World Bank study: ‘voices are editorialised so as to tune out any 
discordant sounds and present an overarching narrative that is in perfect harmony with 
the World Bank’s own policies’. 
 
11
 Unlike this study, the reality check was not primarily designed to understand 
people’s views of international aid, but simply to gain insights into how people 
experienced the unfolding implementation of policy reforms in the health and 
education sectors. 
 
12
 The reality check suggests it is unwise to separate “pure” and “applied” work too 
strictly. What was originally conceived as an applied intervention provided wider 
conceptual insights (see Gardner & Lewis 2015). 
 
13
 See also the related ethnographic study of aid organizations that has become known 
as “aidnography” (Gould 2004; Mosse 2009). 
 
14
 For example, public administration scholar Rod Rhodes’ (2005) work on “everyday 
life in a public ministry” focused on the interests and behaviors of elite policy actors 
in the UK. See also Gains (2011). 
 
15
 In retrospect one of the distinguishing features of the project was that it did not 
have an explicitly formulated “theory of change”. This was a criticism later made by 
the Pain et al. (2013) independent evaluation. 
 
16
 Of the nine field workers recruited, all were local except for two. Some were 
Masters level anthropology graduates, others development professionals working 
within participatory traditions. The two international staff had extensive experience of 
fieldwork in Bangladesh. 
 
17
 For a more detailed reflection on the approach and methodology in practice, see 
Arvidson (2013) and Lewis (2012b). 
 
18
 The approach supported the idea that “stories” can be seen as valuable in generating 
potential useful data that is “in need of corroboration” (Gabriel, 1998, p.137). 
 
19
 The reality check teams found that the resources allocated for this initiative simply 
disappeared in most of its schools. In the one or two cases where a motivated head 
teacher decided to use these resources as intended and operationalize the scheme, it 
provided the schools with a decentralized platform that was useful for upgrading local 
facilities and teaching environment. 
 
20
 Although there is now more recognition of the problems created by curbing the use 
of TBAs in favor of “skilled” alternative service providers, this was a controversial 
finding in Bangladesh at the time. For continuing concerns in relation to the enforced 
use of biomedical midwifery services to women in support of development targets in 
Malawi, where the use of TBAs have been restricted, see Danielsen (2017). 
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21
 The evaluation was also critical of the reporting and attribution of some reality 
check data, and to a lack of precision around arguments and claims made in the 
reports. 
 
22
 In recent work, Copestake and Remnant (2015) seek to address these types of 
general criticisms in relation to people-centered forms of qualitative evaluation. 
 
23
 In the context of social science methodology, stories can be understood to derive 
their “truth” from meaning, not necessarily from accuracy (Gabriel 1998, p. 136). 
This poses challenges for their role in research, and by extension, policy. 
 
24
 The framing of the reality check data as discursive and messy - rather than linear 
and solution-focused - created a disjuncture that was at odds with the more 
systematically ordered forms of quantitative knowledge that structured the program 
monitoring systems. Both framing and filtering were strategies used by policy makers 
to diminish the value of the reality check information. The practice of filtering is one 
way that policy makers seek to manage the flow of evidence by prioritizing or 
discounting.  
 
25
 Following the original Bangladesh initiative, the reality check approach has been 
adapted and used in a variety of contexts (including Nepal, Mozambique and 
Indonesia). See for example the Swiss Development Cooperation’s (SDC) use of the 
approach in Nepal (SDC 2015). This wider replication signals its relevance and 
perceived value to some development agencies, but also perhaps to its vulnerability to 
commodification and assimilation. 
 
26
 For example, one enthusiastic advocate of the reality check approach was from a 
bilateral donor that was not involved in the SWAPs. 
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